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A cross-categorial definite determiner:
Evidence from Ga (Kwa)*
Agata Renans
Universität Potsdam
Abstract This paper contributes to the growing body of evidence that in a cross-
linguistic perspective there are definite descriptions of categories other than NPs.
Based on novel data from Ga, an under-researched language spoken in Ghana, the
paper argues that the definite determiner lE marks overtly familiarity and uniqueness
in both the nominal and the verbal domain. When lE attaches to the VP, it marks an
event as definite. The paper shows that definiteness in the verbal domain not only
exists but also has the same properties as in the nominal domain, pointing to further
parallelism between both.
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1 Introduction
It has been observed in the literature that in a cross-linguistic perspective languages
can mark other categories than NPs as definite. For example, Baker & Travis (1997)
argue that mood prefixes in Mohawk mark the verbal equivalent of (in)definiteness,
Larson (2003) analyzes final clausal definite determiners in FOn and Haitian Creole
as definite adverbs, and Grubic (2015) proposes analyzing the Ngamo background
marker i/=ye as a definiteness marker of topic situations.
Even though the idea that languages have definite descriptions in domains other
than the nominal one is not new, there are at least two important points that make
the Ga definite determiner lE interesting from a theoretical point of view. First, it has
the same overt form in both the nominal and the verbal domain and shows exactly
the same properties in both. Second, as a consequence it interacts with the aspectual
and evidential information of the sentence; that is, clefted imperfective sentences
with lE attached to the VP invariably convey a progressive aspectual reference and
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require direct evidential contexts in order to be felicitously uttered, as demonstrated
in (1a–d).1
(1) Kòfí
Kofi
nì
PRT
sèlè-O´
swim-IMPF
lE.
DET
‘It is Kofi who is swimming.’
a. progressive context: Tom and his family (wife, two sons, and two daugh-
ters) are on the beach. Tom and his wife can see a swimming child.
⇒ Tom can utter (1) in this context
b. habitual context: Tom’s youngest son and daughters do not like swimming
and they do not do it, but his oldest son, Kofi, loves swimming and he does
it regularly. ⇒ Tom cannot utter (1) in this context
c. direct evidence context: Tom and his family (wife, two sons, and two
daughters) are on the beach. Tom can see that his youngest son and two
daughters are playing with sand and his oldest son, Kofi, is swimming.
⇒ Tom can utter (1) in this context
d. indirect evidence context: The same as before but this time Tom cannot
see his oldest son, but the younger one told him that Kofi was in the process
of swimming.
⇒ Tom cannot utter (1) in this context
That the progressive and evidential interpretation in (1) is caused by the definite
determiner lE is suggested by the observation that sentences without VP lE obtain a
habitual but not a progressive interpretation, as demonstrated in (2), and they do not
put any constraints on their evidential interpretation.
(2) Kòfí
Kofi
nì
PRT
sèlè-O´.
swim-IMPF
‘It is Kofi who swims.’
a. progressive context: Tom and his family (wife, two sons, and two daugh-
ters) are on the beach. Tom and his wife can see a swimming child.
⇒ Tom cannot utter (2) in this context
b. habitual context: Tom’s youngest son and daughters do not like swimming
and they do not do it, but his oldest son, Kofi, loves swimming and he does
it regularly. ⇒ Tom can utter (2) in this context
1 The glosses used in this paper: DET = determiner; 1 = First person; 2 = Second person; 3 = Third
person; PRT = particle; NOM = nominalizer; NEG = negation; COMPL = complementizer; REL =
relativizer; IMPF = imperfective; PROG = progressive; IMP = imperative. An example marked with
‘#’ means that the example was judged as unacceptable in the given context and I hypothesize that it
is for semantic or pragmatic reasons. Examples without any diacritics were judged as acceptable in
the given context.
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The goal of this paper is two-fold: First, it provides novel empirical evidence
that cross-categorial definite determiners are attested in natural language. Second, it
gives a formal semantic analysis. In particular, I argue that both in the nominal and
the verbal domain the definite determiner lE encodes the information that a discourse
referent, an event in the case of the verbal domain, is both familiar and unique in
bearing the property in question. This, together with the imperfective aspectual
reference conveyed by the marker -O, leads to the invariable progressive and direct
evidential interpretation of (1).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
variety of ways used to convey a definite interpretation in Ga. One of them, i.e.,
the particle lE, is discussed in detail in Section 3. This section presents the main
data providing empirical evidence that lE is a cross-categorial definite determiner
marking definiteness in both the nominal and the verbal domain. Its formal semantic
analysis is presented in Section 4. Subsequently, Section 5 discusses the predictions
of the analysis, i.e., the interaction with the aspectual and evidential interpretation
of the sentence. Section 6, in turn, considers further research directions and briefly
discusses the semantic properties of another cross-categorial definite determiner in
Ga: nEE. Section 7 concludes.
Before I dive into the discussion of definiteness in Ga, let me give some informa-
tion on the Ga language itself, the language consultants, and the methodology used.
Ga (Kwa) is an under-researched Ghanaian language spoken in The Greater Accra
Region by ca. 600,000 speakers. Its basic word order is SVO and it has two tones:
Low and High. All the data stem from the author’s fieldwork with six Ga native
speakers in Accra in 2014 and 2016 and one Ga native speaker in Berlin in 2015
(four women, two men). All of the language consultants grew up in a Ga-speaking
community. Five of the native speakers consulted in Accra were students at the
time of conducting the fieldwork, one of them with a background in linguistics.
The methodology follows Matthewson 2004 and the tasks comprised mostly of
acceptability judgment tasks in the given context.
2 Definiteness in Ga
It has been proposed in the literature that definite determiners encode uniqueness of
the discourse referent, its existence, its familiarity, or a subset thereof. Following
Frege (1892); Heim & Kratzer (1998); Schwarz (2009); Elbourne (2013), among
others, definite determiners were analyzed as encoding both uniqueness and exis-
tence inferences as presuppositions. On the approach labeled as Weak-Fregean by
Coppock & Beaver (2015), uniqueness is presupposed but the existence inference
is not encoded by the definite determiner, and under a Russellian (1905) approach,
both uniqueness and existence are asserted. By contrast, Heim (1982); Szabó (2000,
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2003), and Roberts (2003) propose analyzing definite determiners in terms of fa-
miliarity defined in various ways.2 Moreover, Barlew (2014) argues that the Bulu
definite determiner -tè encodes along with uniqueness salience of the discourse
referent, defined in terms of attention capture.
Looking at Ga, a definite interpretation can be conveyed by different means
which differ with respect to the meaning expressed by them. It seems that whereas
the definite determiners lE and nEE encode both uniqueness and familiarity of the
discourse referent, bare nouns, which allow for either definite or indefinite inter-
pretations, encode solely its uniqueness.3 That bare NPs can convey a definite
interpretation is presented below in (3), which shows that they are acceptable when
the NP referent is unique. At the same time, bare NPs are not acceptable in (4).
It seems that this is the case because there was more than one town elder at the
celebration; i.e., there was not a unique town elder at the celebration.
(3) context: There was a Ghanaian national day yesterday and there were a lot of
celebrations in Accra which were visited by one president and many town
elders:
Mì-nà
1SG-see
màN`híE`nyìE´lO´.
president
‘I saw the president.’
(4) context: There were five town elders at the celebration. We’ve talked about
one of them. I say:
#Mì-nà
1SG-see
màN`
town
ònúkpá.
elder
intended: ‘I saw the town elder.’
By contrast, the distribution of the definite determiner nEE is restricted to contexts
in which the referent NP is both unique in bearing the property in question and
familiar to the speaker as well as to the hearer.4 A piece of data suggesting this kind
of empirical generalization is given in (5):5
2 Note, however, that Roberts (2003) proposes that definites encode both familiarity and the informa-
tional uniqueness of the discourse referent.
3 For empirical evidence that bare NPs in Ga allow for indefinite interpretation, see Renans 2015.
4 One question is: What is the relation between the definite determiner nEE and the demonstrative nE?
Preliminary data suggest that nEE is not a demonstrative, but more fieldwork on the semantics of nEE
and nE must be conducted to warrant definite conclusions regarding the differences and similarities in
their semantics.
5 The test in (5) follows the examples in Arkoh & Matthewson 2013.
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(5) context: Nardu visits her friend Ama. Ama is cooking banku and explains to
Nardu that she bought a very fairly priced cassava on the market yesterday.
The unused cassava is in the basket. While preparing the food, it turns out
that Ama needs more cassava. She says:
Nàr´dù
Nardu
kE`
bring1
dùàdé
cassava
nEE
DET
ní
REL
yOO
BE
kE`N`tE´N´
basket
lE
DET
mlì
inside
a-bà.
IMP-bring2
‘Nardu, bring the cassava that is in the basket.’
Note that nEE is not acceptable in a context in which Nardu (the hearer) does
not know about the cassava. Whereas the precise formal analysis of the definite
interpretation of bare NPs and the definite determiner nEE has to await another
occasion, in this paper I concentrate on the semantics of the definite determiner lE.6,7
I claim that lE encodes the information that a discourse referent is unique in
bearing the property in question and familiar. A taxonomy of familiarity (Roberts
2003) is presented in (6):
(6) Taxonomy of familiarity:
a. strong familiarity: the NP has as antecedent a discourse referent introduced
via the utterance of a (usually) preceding NP
b. weak familiarity:
i. the entity referred to is perceptually accessible to the interlocutors
ii. the entity referred to is globally familiar in the general culture or at least
among the participants in the discourse, although not mentioned in the
immediate discourse
iii.introduction of the NP’s discourse referent is licensed solely by contex-
tual existence entailments
iv.weak familiarity is guaranteed by giving a functional interpretation to the
definite description (which function may have to be accommodated with
the intended argument(s) both familiar and highly salient (Bridging))
(Roberts 2003: 304)
In what follows, I argue that the felicitous use of lE requires a discourse referent
to be either strongly or weakly familar; i.e., they exhibit various kinds of familiarity
listed in (6).
6 Note that the particle lE comes in two forms: as a low tone lE`, which is a third person singular pronoun,
and tonally unspecified lE with a floating high tone which docks onto the preceding syllable (Dakubu
1992). Tonally unspecified lE attaches to various elements; e.g., NPs, VPs, temporal subordinate
clauses, relative clauses, and antecedents of conditionals. Moreover, it functions as a topic marker
(Renans 2016). In this paper, though, I concentrate solely on the use of lE as a definite determiner.
7 See also Dakubu 1992 and Dakubu 2005 for previous analyses of lE.
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3 The definite determiner lE
3.1 NP lE
Example (7) shows that lE cannot be used at the beginning of the conversation,
suggesting the analysis of lE as requiring a familiar discourse referent. It is in line
with the observation that lE can be felicitously used in the second sentence of (7), in
which a discourse referent wolo ‘book’ is strongly familiar due to the antecedent NP
wolo in the first sentence:
(7) context: beginning of the conversation
Mì-káne
1SG-read
wòlo
book
(#lE)
DET
nyE`.
yesterday
Wòlo
book
#(lE)
DET
è-NO`O´
3SG-be.tasty
wàà.
very
‘I read a book yesterday. The book was interesting.’
The definite determiner lE can also be used when the discourse referent is not
strongly but weakly familiar, e.g., due to perceptual evidence or general knowledge,
as demonstrated in (8) and (9), respectively:
(8) context: I see that a boy is kicking John. I say:
GbE´kE
child
nùú
man
lE
DET
mìì-bútu
PROG-kick
John.
John
‘The boy is kicking John.’
(9) context: There was a Ghanaian national day yesterday and there was a big
celebration ceremony in Accra which was visited by the Ghanaian president
and town elders. I met my friend. We talked about how beautiful the celebra-
tion was (but we didn’t talk about who was there). He asked me whether I
saw any famous person. I reply:
Mì-nà
1SG-see
màN`híE`nyìE´lO´
president
lE.
DET
‘I saw the president.’
The determiner lE is also acceptable in bridging contexts in which the discourse
referent has not been previously mentioned but it is familiar due to the relation be-
tween the discourse referent picked up by the definite determiner and the previously
mentioned discourse referent, as in (10), where the first sentence sets the scene for
the second one:
(10) Nardu
Nardu
he
buy
ataade
dress
fEEfeO.
beautiful
NikpelO
tailor
lE
DET
he-ee
take-NEG
shika
money
pii.
many
‘Nardu bought a beautiful dress. The tailor didn’t take a lot of money.’
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Conversely, example (11) shows that lE cannot be felicitously used when a
discourse referent is unfamiliar:
(11) context: Kofi went to the market and bought several books we never talked
about.
#Kofi
Kofi
he
buy
woji
books
lE.
DET
‘Kofi bought the books.’
However, the familiarity of the discourse referent is not sufficient for lE to be
felicitously used. Examples (12 – 14) provide evidence that the discourse referent
picked up by lE must not only be familiar but also unique in bearing the property
in question. Consider (12). Since there is only one president, which in addition is
familiar due to general knowledge, (12a) is acceptable in the context of (12). By
contrast, the governors are neither unique nor familiar and thus (12b) is unacceptable
in the context of (12).
(12) context: Yesterday was the Ghanaian national day and there were a lot of
celebrations in Accra, which were visited by one president and many town
elders.
a. Mì-nà
1SG-see
màN`híE`nyìE´lO´
governor
lE.
DET
‘I saw the president.’
b. #Mì-nà
1SG-see
màN`
town
ònúkpá
elder
lE.
DET
‘I saw the town elder.’
Importantly, (12b) becomes acceptable, if one of the town elders was discussed
before, as in (13). However, it is still unacceptable if more than one elder was
discussed, as illustrated in (14), supporting the idea that the discourse referent
picked up by lE needs to be both familiar and unique in bearing the property in
question. Note, however, that lE does not require a discourse referent to be unique in
general but rather that the familiar discourse referent is unique, which comes down
to Roberts’s (2003) notion of informational uniqueness.
(13) context: There were five town elders at the celebrations. We’ve talked about
one of them. ⇒ (12b) is acceptable in this context
(14) context: There were five town elders at the celebrations. We’ve talked about
two of them. ⇒ (12b) is unacceptable in this context
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This view is also supported by the unacceptability of (15a) as the continuation of
(15), providing additional evidence that the discourse referent picked up by lE must
be informationally unique:
(15) Mì-káne
1SG-read
wò-jì
book-PL
ényO`
two
nyE`.
yesterday
‘I read two books yesterday.’
a. #Wòló
book
lE
DET
è-NO`O´
3SG-be.tasty
wàà.
very
‘The book was interesting.’
Moreover, Barlew (2014) proposed another dimension, besides familiarity and
uniqueness, along which the semantics of definite determiners differ, i.e., salience.
He showed that the Bulu definite determiner -tè encodes uniqueness and salience
defined in terms of attention capture; i.e., in order to felicitously use -tè the speaker
‘needs to have (accurate) evidence that the addressee is attending to that antecedent’
(Barlew 2014: 625). It predicts the acceptability of the target sentence (16b-i) in the
context of (16a), in which the addressee’s attention is captured by the sun due to the
action of opening the window, and the unacceptability of (16b-i) in the context of
(16b), in which the speaker does not have any evidence that the adressee’s attention
is captured by the sun. Whereas, these predicitons are borne out in Bulu, the Ga
target sentence in (16b-i) is acceptable in both contexts suggesting that salience is
not encoded by lE.8
(16) a. context 1: Kofi is sitting on a bus when a man he does not know sits down
beside him. The stranger opens the window shade on the bus, letting in
sunlight and says (16b-i).
b. context 2: Kofi is sitting on a bus when a man he does not know sits down
beside him. The stranger says (16b-i).
i. Hùlú
sun
lE
DET
mìì-kpE´
PROG-shine
wàà
strongly
NmE´nE´.
today
‘The sun is bright today.’
⇒ The stranger can utter (16b-i) in both contexts
Summing up, NP lE encodes familiarity of the discourse referent and its unique-
ness in bearing the property in question but not salience.
8 The test in (16) follows the examples in Barlew 2014.
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3.2 VP lE
The definite determiner lE attaches to VPs across all aspectual categories with
the caveat that the sentence must be clefted.9 This is illustrated in (17a,18a) and
(17b,18b) for the unmarked aspectual reference and sentences conveying imperfec-
tive aspectual reference, respectively.10,11
(17) a. *Kòfí
Kofi
sèlé
swim
lE.
DET
intended: ‘Kofi swam.’
b. *Kòfí
Kofi
sèlè-O´
swim-IMPF
lE.
DET
intended: ‘Kofi swims.’
(18) a. Kòfí
Kofi
nì
PRT
sèlé
swim
lE.
DET
‘It is Kofi who swam.’
b. Kòfí
Kofi
nì
PRT
sèlè-O´
swim-IMPF
lE.
DET
‘It is Kofi who is swimming.’
Looking at its semantics, VP lE has the same properties as NP lE; that is, it
encodes the information that the discourse referent, an event in the case of VP lE, is
both familiar and unique in bearing the property in question. A piece of evidence that
lE encodes familiarity also in the verbal domain comes from the contrast presented
in (19). Whereas VP lE is acceptable in the context in which a swimming event was
discussed before, it is unacceptable in the context in which the swimming event was
not previously discussed:
(19) Kofi
Kofi
ni
PRT
sele
swim
lE.
DET
‘It is Kofi who swam.’
a. context: We didn’t talk about swimming before. Suddenly, I have decided
to tell my friend who was swimming yesterday. ⇒ I cannot utter (19 )
b. context: We talked about swimming before and we are arguing who swam
yesterday. ⇒ I can utter (19) in this context
9 Clefts in Ga are introduced by the particle nì. For analysis, see Renans 2016 and Renans to appear.
10 Note that clefts with the particle nì but without the final clausal particle lE are acceptable.
11 For the whole paradigm, see Renans 2016.
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As NP lE, VP lE exhibits bridging uses of the definite determiner, in which
the discourse referent is familiar due to the relation between the discourse referent
picked up by lE and the antecedent event description. This is illustrated below with
(20), in which there is a part-whole relation between the triathlon in the context and
the swimming event in the target sentence:
(20) context: There was a team-triathlon yesterday.
Kòfí
Kofi
nì
PRT
sèlé
swim
lE.
DET
‘It is Kofi who swam.’
Turning to the uniqueness inference, the fact that the definite determiner lE only
attaches to the VP in cleft structures, introduced by the particle ni, poses challenges
to tease apart the exhaustivity triggered by clefts and the uniqueness triggered by the
definite determiner lE. For illustration, consider (21):
(21) context: John, Tom, and Maria are in the process of swimming.
#John
John
nì
PRT
sèlè-O´
swim-IMPF
lE.
DET
‘It is John who is swimming.’
Since clefts give rise to an exhaustive interpretation of the pivot, i.e., that John
and nobody else swam, the target sentence in (21) is infelicitous in the context in
which additional people swam. Thus, examples like (21) do not provide any evidence
regarding the semantics of lE.
It seems that one should aim at finding contexts in which the exhaustivity effect
triggered by the cleft structure does not interfere with the uniqueness effect triggered
by lE, i.e., contexts in which the same agent performs either one activity or more
than one activity of the given kind. Importantly, whereas the cleft structure would be
felicitous in both cases, VP lE would be felicitous in the former case but not in the
latter one. It seems that these kinds of contexts are habitual vs. progressive aspectual
contexts. It is predicted that VP lE should be unacceptable in habitual contexts in
which, for example, Kofi swims regularly, and acceptable in progressive contexts in
which there is an ongoing unique event of swimming by Kofi. And these predictions
are borne out, as demonstrated in (1), repeated below in (22):
(22) Kòfí
Kofi
nì
PRT
sèlè-O´
swim-IMPF
lE.
DET
‘It is Kofi who is swimming.’
a. progressive context: Tom and his family (wife, two sons, and two daugh-
ters) are on the beach. Tom and his wife can see a swimming child.
⇒ Tom can utter (22) in this context
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b. habitual context: Tom’s youngest son and daughters do not like swimming
and they do not do it, but his oldest son, Kofi, loves swimming and he does
it regularly. ⇒ Tom cannot utter (22) in this context
To conclude this section, it was shown that both in the nominal and the verbal
domain the definite determiner lE encodes the information that a discourse referent
is familiar and unique in bearing the property in question, which is typical for
definite determiners in a cross-linguistic perspective. A formal semantic analysis of
a cross-categorial lE is given in the next section.
4 Analysis
Various proposals haven been made to model the semantics of definite determiners,
e.g., Frege (1892); Russell (1905); Heim (1982); Roberts (2003); Elbourne (2005);
Schwarz (2009); Neale (2004), among many others. I propose formalizing the
familiarity and uniqueness of lE in Elbourne’s (2005) system, extending his analysis
to the VP domain.
Elbourne (2005) argues that definite determiners, at least in English, take two
arguments, i.e., an NP and a covert pronominal index of type 〈e, t〉.12,13
(23) DP
e
NP
〈e, t〉
D
〈〈e, t〉 ,e〉
3
〈e, t〉
the
〈〈e, t〉 ,〈〈e, t〉 ,e〉〉
The index can be either bound or interpreted with respect to the assignment
function g which maps variables to familiar entities. With the latter, the definite
description obtains a referential interpretation and it does not give rise to the inference
that the NP is unique. For example, (24) says that there is a unique murderer such
that the murderer is g(3), but crucially it does not say that there is a unique murderer
in general.
12 See Elbourne 2013 for a competing view that the English definite determiner the takes two arguments,
i.e., an NP and a situation but not an index.
13 Following Elbourne (2005), Schwarz (2009) and Arkoh & Matthewson (2013) argue that German
strong definite determiners and the Akan definite determiner nU, respectively, also take an NP and a
covert pronominal index as arguments.
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(24) J[[the3] murderer]Kg = the unique individual x such that x is a murderer and
x = g(3) (Elbourne 2005: 154)
In order to neutralize the referential interpretation effect of interpreting the
covert pronominal index with respect to the assignment function, Elbourne (2005)
introduces a special dummy index 0, interpreted as λx : xe.xe. Its presence in the
structure triggers a unique, attributive, i.e., not referential, interpretation of the NP,
as illustrated in (25):
(25) J[[the 0] murderer]Kg = the unique individual x such that x is a murderer
(Elbourne 2005: 154)
Turning to Ga, I claim that the definite determiner lE also takes two arguments:
the NP and the pronominal index, which I formally analyze as a variable of type e.14
The lexical entry for lE is given in (26):
(26) JlEK= λy.λP : ∃!x[P(x)∧ x = y].ιx[P(x)∧ x = y] [to be revised]
Moreover, following Musan (1995); Büring (2004); Keshet (2008); Schwarz
(2009) and Elbourne (2013), I claim that definite determiners introduce situation
pronouns to the syntax:
(27) DP
NP D2
3 D1
s1 Det
The variable s is a syntactically represented situation pronoun introducing the
situation with reference to which the NP denotation is interpreted. The index 3 is an
additional pronominal argument taken by the definite determiner which is mapped
by the assignment function to a familiar entity, as discussed above.
Since lE is a strong determiner, I claim that it also introduces a situation pronoun:
(28) JlEK= λ s.λy.λP : ∃!x[x is ins∧P(x)∧x= y].ιx[x is ins∧P(x)∧x= y] [final]
For illustration, the structure of wolo lE (‘the book’) is presented in (29) and its
derivation in (30):15,16
14 In this respect, I am following Schwarz’s (2009) and Arkoh & Matthewson’s (2013) analyses in
which the pronominal index is also of type e.
15 For presentational reasons, I omit the presupposed material.
16 Note that all pronominal elements receive their value via the assignment function. However, in order
to increase the readability of the formulas, I do not mark it. The same holds for the derivation in (32).
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(29) DP
e
wolo
〈e, t〉
D2
〈〈e, t〉 ,e〉
3
e
D1
〈e,〈〈e, t〉 ,e〉〉
s1 lE
〈s,〈e,〈〈e, t〉 ,e〉〉〉
(30) a. JD1Kg = λy.λP.ιx[x is ins1∧P(x)∧ x = y]
b. JD2Kg = λy.λP.ιx[x is ins1∧P(x)∧ x = y](g(3))
= λP.ιx[x is ins1∧P(x)∧ x = g(3)]
c. JDPKg = JD2Kg(JwoloKg) = ιx[x is ins1∧wolo(x)∧ x = g(3)]
≈ the unique individual x such that x is in the situation s1 and x is a book
and x is identical to g(3)
This analysis can account for the data presented in Section (3). The assignment
function maps the covert index to familiar entities and thus it accounts for familiar
uses of lE. In addition, the data presented in Section 3 suggest that lE never triggers
the interpretation that a discourse referent is unique in general but that a familiar
discourse referent is unique in bearing the property in question. Therefore, I do not
assume any special index which would neutralize the interpretive effects of analyzing
the covert index with respect to the assignment function.
I argue that VP lE has the same semantics as NP lE and therefore I propose the
same lexical entry for both of them. When lE attaches to the VP, it takes a property (a
set of events) and says that there is a unique familiar event which has this property.
As an example, the structure of sele lE (‘the swimming event’) is given in (31) and
its derivation in (32):17
17 The structure in (31) is unusual in that D takes vP as its argument and it does not project its properties.
It might be that both NP lE and VP lE have the same semantics, but they are not of the same syntactic
category. For presentational reasons, however, I am labeling VP lE and NP lE in a uniform way. A
more detailed explication of this issue has to await future research.
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(31) vP
ε
vP
〈ε, t〉
x1 sele
D2
〈〈ε, t〉 ,ε〉
3
ε
D1
s2 lE
〈ε,〈〈ε, t〉 ,ε〉〉
(32) a. JD2Kg = λP.ιe[e is ins1∧P(e)∧ e = g(3)]
b. JvPKg = λe.swim(e)∧Ag(e) = x1
c. JVPKg = JDKg(JvPK)
= [λP.ιe[e is ins1∧P(e)∧ e = g(3)]](λe.swim(e)∧Ag(e) = x1)
= ιe[e is ins1∧ swim(e)∧Ag(e) = x1∧ e = g(3)]
≈ the unique event e such that e is in s1 and e is a swimming event, whose
agent is x1 and e is g(3)
The last question that must be answered is why VP lE is only acceptable in
clefted sentences. I argue that it is an effect of Maximize Presupposition (Heim
1991):
(33) Maximize presupposition: Among a set of alternatives, use the felicitous
sentence with the strongest presupposition. (Chemla 2008: 142)
Now, consider two alternative constructions in (34):
(34) a. Kofi
Kofi
ni
PRT
sele-O
swim-IMPF
lE.
DET
‘It is Kofi who is swimming’
b. #Kofi sele-O lE.
Importantly, events are instantiated in worlds by individuals. Conceptually, while
it is impossible to identify a swimming event without knowing its agent(s), one can
easily identify a swimming event by Kofi. However, if Bill is swimming as well,
then it is not an event of swimming by Kofi but an event of swimming by Kofi and
Bill. Now, the sentence in (34a) triggers a stronger presupposition than (34b); i.e.,
it triggers the exhaustive interpretation that Kofi and nobody else is swimming and
thus it unambiguously identifies the swimming event. Therefore, due to Maximize
Presupposition, (34b) becomes unacceptable.
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5 Consequences of the analysis: Progressive aspectual reference, events not-
instantiated at the topic time, and evidentiality
This analysis of the definite determiner lE predicts its interaction with the aspectual
and evidential interpretation of the sentence when lE is attached to a VP, which are
discussed below.
5.1 Progressive aspectual reference and events non-instantiated at the topic
time
Imperfective aspect, marked by the suffix -O in Ga, entails the information that the
topic time is included in the running time of the event:
(35) J-OK = λP〈ε,t〉.λ ti.∃e[t ⊆ τ(e)∧P(e)] ≈ there is such an event that the con-
textually given topic time is included in the running time of the event
Now, if lE conveys the meaning that there is a unique event in the VP denotation,
an imperfective sentence with VP lE should necessarily obtain a progressive interpre-
tation. This prediction is borne out, as it was shown in (1), repeated below in (36). I
call this structure the analytic progressive. Note also that the same sentence without
the VP lE is acceptable in the habitual context in (36a) but not in the progressive
context in (36b).18
(36) Kòfí
Kofi
nì
PRT
sèlè-O´
swim-IMPF
lE.
DET
‘It is Kofi who is swimming.’
a. progressive context: Tom and his family (wife, two sons, and two daugh-
ters) are on the beach. Tom and his wife can see a swimming child.
⇒ (36) is acceptable in this context
b. habitual context: Tom’s two sons and daughters do not like swimming
and they do not do it, but his oldest son, Kofi, loves swimming and he does
it regularly. ⇒ (36) is unacceptable in this context
In addition, the interpretation of the analytic progressive, due to the presence
of lE, among others, is restricted to the unique event which is ongoing at the topic
time. Therefore, it is predicted to be unacceptable in contexts in which the event,
even though it might be ongoing, is not actually instantiated at the topic time, and
18 Note, however, that I argue in Renans 2016 that the invariable progressive interpretation conveyed by
the analytic progressive in Ga is not solely caused by the interaction between the imperfective aspect
and the definite determiner lE but by the interaction between the two aforementioned elements and
the notion of exemplification (Kratzer 2007; Schwarz 2009) induced by the particle ni.
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this prediction is borne out. Consider (37). It is unacceptable, because the event
of reading Harry Potter by John is not an ongoing, actual event. The topic time,
which in the case of (37) coincides with the utterance time, cannot be included in
the running time of the event of John reading Harry Potter, because at the topic time
of (37), John is not reading anything but running.
(37) Tom and John are jogging. They are talking about books. Tom asks John
which books he is reading. John replies:
#‘Harry
‘Harry
Potter’
Potter’
nì
PRT
mí
1.SG
kánè-O`
read-IMPF
lE.
DET
‘I am reading ‘Harry Potter’.’
5.2 Evidentiality
The fact that the definite determiner lE encodes the information that a discourse
referent, an event in the verbal domain, is not only unique in bearing the property in
question but also familiar leads to predictions concerning the evidential interpretation
of the sentences. In particular, it predicts VP lE to be only acceptable in contexts
in which the speaker is familiar with the event, which in the case of progressive
contexts would mean that the speaker has direct access to the event.
In Section 2, I presented Roberts’s (2003) taxonomy of familiarity. She claims
that a discourse referent is familiar if it is introduced by preceding linguistic material
or it is salient in the utterance situation. In the analytic progressive an event is actually
ongoing at the utterance time. Now, if the speaker got third-hand information that for
example Kofi is swimming, i.e, the event was introduced by the linguistic material,
she is familiar with the event. However, the speaker cannot be sure whether Kofi is
still in the process of swimming at the time of speaking, which is required by the
analytic progressive. It predicts that even though an event for which the speaker has
reportative evidence is familiar, since it might not be ongoing at the utterance time,
it is not sufficient for the felicitous use of sentences with the analytic progressive
form. Therefore, the prediction is that the interpretation of the analytic progressive
with the definite determiner lE is restricted to the events that the speaker has direct
evidence for. As demonstrated in (1), repeated below in (38), this prediction is borne
out:
(38) Kòfí
Kofi
nì
PRT
sèlè-O´
swim-IMPF
lE.
DET
intended: ‘It is Kofi who is swimming.’
a. direct evidence context: Tom and his family (wife, two sons, and two
daughters) are on the beach. Tom can see that his one son and two daughters
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are playing with sand and his oldest son, Kofi, is swimming.
⇒ Tom can utter (38) in this context
b. indirect evidence context: The same as before but this time Tom cannot
see his oldest son, but the younger one told him that he was in the process
of swimming.
⇒ Tom cannot utter (38) in this context
To sum up, in this section I have identified several consequences of the proposed
analysis of the VP lE for the aspectual and evidential interpretation of the sentence,
especially with the imperfective aspectual form. The question that arises immediately
is whether the same interactions arise in other languages with definite descriptions of
events or whether it is subject to cross-linguistic variation caused by the differences
in the semantics of definite determiners across languages, which should be answered
in the course of future research.
6 Outlook
As already demonstrated in Section 2, there are ways of conveying a definite inter-
pretation in Ga other than using the definite determiner lE. For example, one can use
another definite determiner, namely nEE.
Interestingly, the definite determiner nEE has a more restricted distribution in
comparison to the definite determiner lE. For example, whereas lE is acceptable in
both contexts presented in (39), nEE is only acceptable in the context of (39b), in
which both the speaker and the hearer know about the discourse referent picked up
by nEE:
(39) Nàr´dù
Nardu
kE`
bring.1
dùàdé
cassava
nE´E´
DET
ní
REL
yO´O
BE
kE`N`tE´N´
basket
lE
DET
mlì
inside
a-bà.
IMP-bring2
‘Nardu, bring the cassava that is in the basket.’
a. Nardu visits her friend Ama. Ama is cooking banku and she needs more
cassava. The cassava is in the basket but Nardu does not know about it.
Also, they didn’t talk about the cassava before.
⇒ Ama cannot utter (39)
b. The same as before but this time Nardu knows about the cassava.
⇒ Ama can utter (39)
Interestingly, as in the case of lE, nEE shows the same semantic properties in the
nominal and the verbal domain. The same as lE, nEE interacts with the aspectual
interpretation of the sentence leading to a progressive interpretation of the sentences
with verbs conveying an imperfective aspectual interpretation. Moreover, same as
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lE, VP nEE also requires a direct evidential context. However, unlike with lE, in the
case of sentences with nEE both the speaker and the hearer must have direct access
to the event, which parallels with the example with the NP nEE in (39).
(40) Kòfí nì sèlè-O` nE´E´.
Kofi PRT swim-IMPF DET
‘It is Kofi who is swimming.’
a. Tom and his family (wife, 2 sons, and 2 daughters) are on the beach. Tom
can see that Kofi is swimming.
⇒ Tom can say (40) to his wife
b. Tom and his children are on the beach. Tom can see that Kofi is swimming.
He is talking to his wife over the phone.
⇒ Tom cannot say (40) to his wife
It seems that the differences in the semantics of lE and nEE can be formally
captured by different presuppositional conditions imposed on the assignment func-
tion g (see the lexical entry for lE given in (26)). However, the full account of the
definiteness system in Ga has to await another occasion.
7 Summary
In the paper, I presented empirical evidence that lE is an overt cross-categorial
definite determiner that attaches to both NPs and VPs. In addition, lE shows the same
semantic properties in both domains: it encodes the information that a discourse
referent picked up by lE is both familiar and unique in bearing the property in
question. This view predicts the interaction of lE with the aspectual and evidential
interpretation conveyed by sentences with VP lE, and these predictions are borne
out. Importantly, the data from Ga raise the question of the existence of overt or
covert definite determiners on events in other languages in particular and the ways
the information about the definite events is conveyed in a cross-linguistic perspective
in general.
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